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15 MAY 1986

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

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JPRS-TAC-86-025

15 MAY 1986

WORLDWIDE REPORT

Arms Control

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At the same time, a Euro-SDI threatens Europe not only from space. As you, Mr Dickenson, have probably noticed, the idea of such a European project originated in Bonn, where it was advanced by the Federal German Defense Minister Woerner. The minister has every support on this from Josef Strauss, a man notorious for his revanchist views and the leader of one of the most extreme right-wing parties in that country. Some of the West German politicians of this type regard SDI and Euro-SDI as something in the nature of compensation for the ban preventing Federal Germany from having nuclear weapons.

This is the reason, Mr Dickenson, why the Soviet Union is in no hurry to respond militarily to the efforts of the United States and a number of (?other) NATO countries to create a new generation of space weapons. The entire history of the postwar period, beginning from the creation of nuclear weapons, shows that Moscow has only been compelled to reciprocate challenges from the United States and its partners in an arms buildup. Today such military challenges and responses have become much more dangerous and I would like therefore to conclude our conversation today with the words from your letter, Mr Dickenson, that I fully support: Let's hope that Americans see sense over the star wars issue.

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CSO: 5200/1345

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA VIEWS AUSTRALIA'S STAND ON SDI PLANS

PM171415 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 86 First Edition p 5

[Oleg Skalkin "Commentator's Column": "The Pressure Is Not Working"]

[Text] Sydney -- Washington's attempts to involve as many states as possible in its space militarization venture have misfired in Australia. This was shown particularly by Pentagon chief C. Weinberger's recent visit here. It has been stated here that "the Australian Government will not compromise on the question of participation in the 'star wars' program."

The stormy debates which have raged in recent days in Australian political and public circles and in the local press have shown that this stance is supported by most Australians. Addressing his party's parliamentary faction, Australian Prime Minister R. Hawke confirmed "the government's resolute opposition to the SDI program." He described reports about the possibility of a change in his stance on this issue as groundless speculation. Defense Minister K. Beazley also said in parliament that it was the government's intention to "strictly adhere to its initial principle of opposing SDI and any Australian participation in research under the program." Judging by these statements, Australia, while remaining an ally of the United States, is nevertheless seeking to define the boundaries of military collaboration with Washington, excluding from it spheres which from Canberra's standpoint deliberately lead to an intensification of the nuclear arms race and undermine the prospects of disarmament.

This display of willfulness on the part of its junior ANZUS partner is clearly not to Washington's liking. There they prefer to pay no heed to statements unfavorable to Americans and carry on regardless. And although in its attempts to win Australia round the United States has not acted as crudely as with New Zealand, which has closed its ports to America's nuclear fleet, the wearing of "velvet gloves" does not soften the "senior partner's" grip. The latest evidence of that was the visit by C. Weinberger, who, according to the newspaper THE AGE, again tried in Canberra "to sell 'star wars' to the Australians.

Weinberger's bait turned out to be the old one: Australian scientists are being tempted by the fact that they will obtain large subsidies for research work in the event of an SDI linkup. Attempts are also being made to inveigle local industrialists with promises of profit from SDI orders...

Thus far, however, American efforts have not been crowned with success. And this is demonstrated not only by the Australian Government's firm refusal to participate in SDI. It is also shown by the resolute rejection of the "star wars" plans among broad strata of the Australian people. Australians, with every justification, regard SDI as an outcome of the American policy of "neoglobalism" which threatens international peace and the peoples' security.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

ITALY'S SPADOLINI, ANDREOTTI ENDORSE SDI PARTICIPATION

Spadolini Report to Senate Group

LD031823 Rome International Service in Italian 1555 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Excerpts] The parties which form the majority, and the right, favor Italy's participation in the U.S. SDI, whereas the Communists, other left-wing groups, and the radicals are against it. This is the outcome of today's debate at the Senate's Foreign and Defense Committees joint session. The foreign and defense ministers, Andreotti and Spadolini, reported on the government's position. Defense Minister Spadolini noted that Italy's participation in SDI will help prevent an increase in the technological gap between the two sides of the Atlantic. Italian firms, he added, are mainly interested in projects concerning radar, optical sensors, electronic components, and laser research.

Andreotti on SDI, Disarmament

AU031313 Rome ANSA in English 1330 GMT 3 Apr 86

[Text] (ANSA) Rome, April 3 -- The four guiding principles used by the Italian Government in assessing the U.S. invitation to participate in its Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) were outlined to a joint session of the Senate Foreign and Defense Committees today by Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti. He summed up these principles as strict observance of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; bolstered stability of strategic East-West balances; a safeguarding of the strategic unity of the Atlantic alliance; and a sharp distinction between the implications for military policy with regard to any eventual deployment of anti-missile defense systems and the economic interests of the research program.

However, Andreotti underscored the view that even abiding by these principles, no general political judgement on the SDI could be made at this time. Wide margins of uncertainty remain on the results of the research program, on the structure the initiative might take on, and on the evolution of the strategic negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, he pointed out. The foreign minister said that Italy must not let the opportunity slip by to allow Italian industry to participate in such scientific and technological operation. He added that the government wanted, first of all, to ascertain that Italian industries did, in fact, have a concrete interest in the research in question. He said that technology represented "vital ground" for the future of the Italian economy, Italy's relations with the other European countries, and Europe's relations with the United States. The objective of giving priority to technological cooperation, therefore, had a general character and acquired a specific valence, with reference to the research program proposed by the United States, he went on.

Turning to the negotiations in Geneva, Andreotti stressed the complexity of the talks but added that despite this fact, several areas of agreement were gradually being discerned. The U.S. and the USSR agree, in fact, on the need to eliminate offensive nuclear arms over the long term, he added. It is obvious, he continued, that this goal is to be seen within the wider framework of seeking balances of forces at the lowest levels possible. This did not involve only nuclear weapons but all sectors of conventional and chemical arms, as well, he said. "For our part", Andreotti continued, "we will not only continue to give our active contribution to the disarmament negotiations, but in the ambit of our participation in the research begun within the framework of the Strategic Defense Initiative, we will work to promote understandings that lead to a cooperative approach in the handling of results of the American and Soviet research programs". The Italian Government holds that the time has come to define, along with the United States, the frame of reference within which Italian companies and research centers can participate in the research and development stage of the American project, and Andreotti concluded.

Senate Briefed

FM091321 Rome AVANTI! in Italian 4 Apr 86 p 12

[Unattributed report: "SDI: Italy Supports Research Projects"]

[Excerpts] "The Italian Government believes the time has come to define with the United States the frame of reference within which Italian firms and research centers can participate in the research and development stage of the American SDI." This was how Foreign Minister Andreotti announced yesterday to the Senate Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees the decision to support the American project, within the above-mentioned limits.

Andreotti recalled the guiding principles behind the government's examination of SDI: strict observance of the ABM Treaty, the strengthening of the stability of strategic balances in East-West relations, the safeguarding of the Atlantic alliance's strategic unity (preventing the creation within it of areas of differentiated security), and a sharp distinction between the political-military implications of the possible future deployment of the antimissile defense system and the economic benefits of the research program.

Briefly, Italy supports the latter aspect while maintaining a reserved stance with regard to the political-military implications, since "there remain broad areas of uncertainty about the actual results of the research program, what structure the initiative might assume, and the evolution of U.S.-USSR strategic negotiations." Italy will continue its "deliberations" on these aspects within the WEU [Western European Union] together with its European allies.

With regard to technological aspects, Andreotti stressed that the opportunity must not be missed to involve our industry in an area of scientific cooperation, since technology "is a vital area for the future of our economy and of our relations with the other European states." Andreotti also stressed the U.S. pledge to honor the ABM Treaty within the context of the research program and to ensure that the program does not have a negative influence on strategic balances.

Next the foreign minister provided an extensive analysis of the current negotiations in Geneva, pointing out that, together with numerous unresolved problems, "certain

areas of agreement have been gradually taking shape," [illegible] in the sphere of intermediate missiles, where "some convergence elements have emerged". In other words the negotiations are not at a standstill, and Italy will work "to facilitate understandings that will lead to a cooperative approach to handling the results of the American and Soviet research programs." Last, Andreotti said that it will be necessary to guarantee Italian concerns participating in the project the necessary information flow with a view of using the results of the actual research for industrial purposes.

The two committees also received a report from Defense Minister Spadolini, according to whom our industries' part [illegible] in the project "also signifies the chance to see clearly, in terms of foreign policy, what subsequent steps can and must be taken for the sake of peace." "Indeed, it is already envisaged that, following completion of the research phase, there should be a phase of intensive consultations among Western countries and with the USSR, and it is important when that time comes for Italy to be in a position to equal status and equal information." Italy must use also this first intermediate stage, "which brings up to all of us to introduce into a new stage on the road to peace and progress."

With regard to the prospects for our participation, Spadolini pointed out that numerous Italian companies are involved in projects concerning in particular the field of radar and optical sensors, electronic components, laser research, and Italy's own suggested satellite project. The present phase of SDI entails international rivalry that will stimulate our industries' innovative capacity and embodies an appeal and a commitment to deal specifically with the issue of finalizing transfers to the production apparatus and of providing incentives for enterprises' use of risk capital for the sake of technological progress."

Returning to political matters, the defense minister observed that "the possible future attainment of the objectives connected with SDI would not remain confined to a single bloc and would presuppose the quest for and specific definition of new forms of bilateral balance between East and West."

Later the defense minister issued the following statement: "Italian industry's participation on a par with American industry requires a prior agreement at government level which, though confined to acceptance of the principle of technological research and without any verdict -- which would be premature now -- on the political strategic implications of SDI, will define the preconditions for our participation -- namely, equal status, observance of already adopted international obligations, and observance of the requirements of the ABM Treaty. Such an understanding," he concluded, "must therefore be regarded as a general frame of reference, a kind of preface, to be followed by the finalization of technical and administrative details governing contractual procedures."

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only defend U.S. territory and very probably fail to shield Western Europe, leaving U.S.-European defenses in disarray and exposing Western Europe to the threat of Soviet medium-range missiles. Therefore, some people in West European political circles strongly call for "a rooftop for Europe." They consider that "to study and produce a European defense system is logical and urgently needed."

Meanwhile, West European countries cannot help taking into consideration the fact that given a shift in emphasis in the U.S.-Soviet arms race from the development of offensive nuclear weapons to the development of both offensive and defensive directed-energy weapons, and from the contest for nuclear superiority to a bid for space superiority, Western Europe must adapt to the changing situation and take appropriate countermeasures. French President Mitterrand pointed out: Europe and France should be prepared and should not allow the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, to monopolize space militarization. (Jia-luo-fu), director of the International Geopolitical Bureau of Paris, and others hold the view: "The sword strategy is gradually changing in the direction of a shield strategy." The development of a space defense system is "a choice that must be made" by Western Europe. Western Europe is talking about the establishment of its own space defense system because it wants to have its place in space and avoid being dictated to by others.

Since the breakdown of the Geneva talks at the end of 1983, the United States has deployed new intermediate-range missiles in Western Europe, while the Soviet Union has taken countermeasures to strengthen its medium- and short-range missiles in the European region. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union is prepared to arm its medium- and short-range missiles with conventional warheads, subjecting Western Europe to a new threat. Given such a serious nuclear confrontation between the superpowers, Western European countries hope to establish their own security screen.

The "Eureka plan" born a year ago is an important step taken by Western Europe to strengthen scientific and technological cooperation on the road to joint efforts to strengthen themselves. After about a year of effort, the "Eureka plan" has assumed an initial form. It has provided for 26 cooperation projects as the first step in the field of the most advanced technology. Good progress has undoubtedly been made in this field of cooperation. The plan takes the study of civilian technologies as its main goal, but it also covers military technologies. Obviously, these military technologies can be applied to establishing a European anti-missile defense system in the future. In a certain sense, the "European Defense Plan" is a further extension of the "Eureka plan" and also supplements it. The two complement each other and are closely related.

At present, the "European Defense Plan" is still in the initial projection stage and is still a long way from official formulation and implementation. Given the purely military nature of this plan, many people are concerned and take a prudent attitude. They are not so enthusiastic about it as for the "Eureka plan."

The United States is showing great concern over Western Europe's involvement with a defense plan. Some people at the Pentagon believe that the United States should help Western Europe "design an anti-missile shield." They also favor incorporating this plan in the U.S. "strategic defense initiative" as its extension or supplement. But others view the West European defense plan with disfavor, contending that the U.S. "Star Wars plan" will form a "protective net" over the air of the Soviet Union, protecting Western Europe against attack, and thus there is no need for Western Europe to separately set up its own defense system. As to the Soviet Union, it will not delight in the realization of this plan. Therefore, it has begun to show opposition to this action by Western Europe by making oblique references.

At present, the "European Defense Plan" has not yet taken shape into a real program. If really worked upon, it will run into many difficulties and obstacles. Political factors aside, various problems related to funds and military coordination cannot be solved overnight. It seems that the establishment of a European antistrategic missile defense system will involve a long process.

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CSO: 5200/4035

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TECHNICAL EXPERTS 'BETTER UNDERSTAND' SDI AFTER U.S. TOUR

OW080349 Tokyo KYODO in English 0341 GMT 8 Apr 86

[Text] Washington, April 7 KYODO--A visit to the United States has helped Japanese experts and government officials better understand President Ronald Reagan's "Star Wars" project, Japanese delegation chief Makoto Watanabe said here Monday. "We now have a full picture of the project," said Watanabe, councillor at the North American Affairs Bureau of the Foreign Ministry.

The mission, including 46 technical experts from 21 private firms, will return to Japan shortly and file a report to the government. The government will use the report to help it decide whether or not Japan should join in research on the project, officially called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The mission, which also included government officials, is the third to be sent by Japan to the United States concerning the space-based antimissile system in which Japan has been urged by Washington to take part. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger renewed the U.S. request in a meeting with Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone in Tokyo last week.

Britain and West Germany have already said they will participate in the research phase of the controversial project. It is expected to be discussed when Nakasone meets Reagan in a U.S. visit starting Saturday.

Speaking to reporters, Watanabe said, "We have felt strong American determination to deal with the SDI project through cooperation by the government and private sectors."

The latest mission began the U.S. visit March 31 with a briefing by experts at the SDI organization of the Defense Department. The missions then split into three groups which visited research institutes and enterprises in the defense industry.

The 21 Japanese firms sending experts included Hitachi Ltd., Toshiba Corp. and other major electronic companies.

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CSO: 5560/077

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

INDIA PAPERS REGRET REAGAN RESPONSE TO GORBACHEV APPEAL

Communist Paper's Editorial

New Delhi PATRIOT in English 5 Apr 86 p 4

[Text]

Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachyov's proposal to urgently meet President Ronald Reagan in any European capital to agree on the termination of all nuclear tests, has evoked only a negative US response. By its latest nuclear test at Nevada, Reagan has exposed not only a wide gap between what the US President says about halting the nuclear weapons race and what he actually does, but has also proved that he did not care a hoot about world public opinion, nor for the appeal of the Six (Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania) which had been welcomed all over the world. The heady wine of SDI (strategic defence initiative) has made Reagan even overlook the persistent demand of the US people that there be a positive response to the moratorium on nuclear tests as proposed and practised by the Soviet Union. Defence Secretary Casper Weinberger has only spelt out what his President had been saying in not so clear terms, that the US would continue with nuclear tests until its star wars plan was perfected. This is a clear enough notice to the peace-loving peoples that the fundamental objective of the present-day US authorities is to frighten the world with nuclear blackmail till it conceded and accepted US hegemony. This mad venture has the support of not only the Pentagon brass and the military-industrial complex which battens on the US taxpayers' money in the name of defence research and manufacture of sophisticated weapon systems, but also the lickspittles of neoimperialism who stalk various regions of the world including ours.

It is in this context that the world will recall that on 6 August last year, the USSR took the initiative to unilaterally declare a six-month moratorium on all nuclear tests. Even before the UN-designated "Year of Peace"

dawned 1 January 1986, Moscow extended the moratorium till 31 March 1986. On both occasions world public opinion hailed these decisions as exemplary initiatives for peace on earth. While Washington just refused to take note of the first step, for the second one the US response was the Nevada nuclear test, the only concession made was an invitation to a Soviet representative to watch the explosion. In response to a new appeal by the leaders of the six countries, the Soviet Union announced its decision to refrain from carrying out a nuclear test until the first US nuclear test.

Past experience has shown that warmongers and those benefiting from war orders are amenable only to pressure of public opinion. The Washington patrons of nuclear warfare on land, sea and in space must be faced with an irresistible anti-war movement to end their machinations. The main task of this anti-war movement must be to make the reluctant Washington realise the necessity of an urgent US-USSR meeting as a first step towards nuclear disarmament. The path to nuclear madness must be abandoned.

Linked to SDI

Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 4 Apr 86 p 8

[Text]

It is most unfortunate, though not in the least surprising, that President Reagan should have spurned Mr. Gorbachov's efforts at generating a momentum towards the establishment of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Mr. Reagan has said no to the proposal for an early summit to negotiate such a ban and he has rejected the proposal for an interim moratorium on nuclear testing. The USA, the USSR and the U.K. had after a long lapse started negotiations on a CTBT in 1977 and by 1980 these discussions had come a long way. But in November 1980, Mr. Reagan came to power and the new administration discontinued negotiations and made it clear by 1982 that it was no longer interested in an early fruition of a CTBT. This being the case, it is utterly hypocritical of the White House to argue, as it so often does, that Mr. Gorbachov keeps throwing up the proposal for a test ban only after the USSR has carried out a programme of explosions and gathered all the information it needs. The series of tests that the Soviets have carried out in 1983 (13) 1984 (11) and 1985 (7) might not have been part of a systematic programme but the fact remains that the reluctance of the U.S. to consider a ban on

further underground nuclear explosions is intimately related to its SDI or "Star Wars" programme. A moratorium on such tests will particularly affect its research in the field of Excalibur X-ray lasers.

American disregard for a CTBT is disappointing for the treaty, even if it is signed by three out of the five acknowledged nuclear powers, would have a positive effect. It would increase pressure on China and France to follow suit. This is of great importance because these two countries continue to carry out open-air testing. Of late, France has been showing utter contempt for the health of the inhabitants and the environment of the Pacific region where it carries out its tests. Such a ban would also strengthen the non-proliferation regime. Furthermore, a CTBT would, if not stop, certainly make more difficult the development of new types of nuclear weapons. Indeed, that is the objective of such a ban. And increased unreliability about the performance capacity of one's nuclear arsenal would also help to discourage ideas of a first strike by either superpower.

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U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

SOVIET ARMY PAPER SEES 'ANTI-GENEVA SYNDROME' IN U.S.

FBIS1405 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 16 Apr 89 Second Edition p 3]

[Lieutenant Colonel Yu. Boris article under the rubric "Imperialism in the Generation of Aggression and Adventurism": "Anti-Geneva Syndrome"]

[Text] It is no longer just days or weeks but months since the Soviet-American summit meeting in Geneva -- that portentous meeting at which the Soviet Union and the United States, in the persons of their leaders, announced the inadmissibility of nuclear war and the impossibility of winning such a war and said that the sides would not seek military superiority. The world public had a right to expect that weighty steps would now be taken to prevent an arms race in space and end it on earth, to limit and reduce nuclear arms, and to strengthen strategic stability.

The Soviet Union justifies the peoples' expectations.

The progressive public perceived as a large-scale peace program the CPSU Central Committee general secretary's statement of 15 January this year, which advanced specific, realistic initiatives with a definite time scale for the elimination of nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons. The desire to preserve and strengthen peace dictated the proposal advanced at the 27th CPSU Congress to create a comprehensive international security system. At a complex time in world relations the Soviet Union is displaying high responsibility and political will.

But what of the United States? How and to what extent has it confirmed in practice the statements which it made jointly with the Soviet Union in Geneva? In the recently published CONGRESSIONAL RECORD G. Studds, member of the House of Representatives for Massachusetts, suggested that any unbiased person should look at the Washington administration's actions from the vantage point of the Geneva accords.

And you will see, the U.S. congressman points out, the continuation of nuclear tests, the development of work under the "star wars" program, a new "juridical interpretation" of the ABM Treaty which renders it meaningless, and a number of other sinister actions. And now an act of direct piracy against sovereign Libya is added to this.

All these facts irrefutably attest that the U.S. ruling group has placed the narrow mercenary interests of the military-industrial complex above the interests of all mankind and of its own people. Emphasis continues to be placed on pursuing a militarist policy and gambling on force in order to dictate its will to other countries and peoples.

Washington has succeeded in doing much to further [illegible] international tension since Geneva. And these actions have been and are of a manifestly demonstrative and arrogant nature and attest to a successful attitude to the generally accepted system of relations among states.

Take, for example, the provocative selling of American spy ships close to Soviet shores. Some of the most zealous Western journalists even acknowledged that Washington action was kind of "test of self-control." Well, once again the Soviet Union really displayed patience and patience. But this is in no way a sign of its weakness. The country is ready to deal a decisive rebuff to any adventurers, and it has sufficient, appropriate means for this. However, we are well aware what this could lead to. Unlike the irresponsible politicians, who have neither a sense of reality nor a sense of responsibility.

In another example — nuclear tests. It is obvious to every sober-minded person that ending them would be a real and effective step on the way to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Without such tests it is impossible to either improve or create new kinds of nuclear arms. But the U.S. Administration rejected outright the Soviet proposal for a moratorium on all nuclear explosions and for summit-level talks on questions of a total ban on nuclear weapon tests. Instead, it carried out further explosions of nuclear devices. The other another

Washington has loudly declared that nuclear weapon tests are really "vitally necessary" for U.S. defense. But is that so? "Forget the propaganda statements that the United States needs to conduct tests in order to be convinced of the efficiency of nuclear charges," THE NEW YORK TIMES writes. "The real reason for continuing the tests, concealed behind a propaganda smoke screen, is that nuclear tests could help in the future to create [secret] new, more sophisticated kinds of weapons, such as nuclear-pumped lasers for the 'star wars' program."

The new explosions are pushing mankind toward a nuclear catastrophe. However, this is of concern to few people in official Washington. People there are seeking to satisfy as far as possible the needs of those who have already received orders to produce MX, Midgetman, and Trident I SLBM's, who are building B-1B and Stealth strategic bombers, and who are creating [secret] space-strike arms.

"The MX project," Pentagon chief C. Weinberger declared, "is among American top priorities and cannot be haggled over." Indeed, the United States is the champion that the unprecedented [illegible] at acquiring sophisticated new weapons. However, a perfectly reasonable question arises: What haggling can there be? We are talking about the planet's future. It is an open secret that the implementation of the "star wars" plan will give a new twist to the arms race spiral, which could take on an uncontrolled and irreversible nature.

I could cite other facts which prove that the United States is not only seeking to eliminate the preconditions for preserving the "spirit of Geneva" but also endeavoring to increase confrontation in the international arena. The method chosen by the U.S. Administration to cover up its provocative actions is also obvious — to lay the blame at someone else's door. All you ever hear from the White House is rantings about a "Soviet military threat." People there repeat the same old theme in every possible way: Despite the ending of nuclear tests, the unilateral reduction of medium-range missiles, and other practical steps by the USSR, still "the threat posed by Soviet forces, conventional and strategic.... remains great."

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U.S. - USSR GENEVA TALKS

FRG'S RUEHL ANALYZES RECENT, CURRENT ARMS CONTROL TALKS

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 1 Apr 86 p 7

[Article by Dr Lothar Ruehl, State Secretary in the FRG Defense Ministry: "Abandoning Medium-Range Weapons Would be the Best Solution--While Taking Measures for Parity in Other Types of Weapons Also"]

[Text] The implementation of worldwide elimination of all land-based medium-range missiles, for the purpose of solving the specific security problem for countries on the Eurasian continent lying within range of Soviet medium-range missiles, as proposed by President Reagan together with the European allies since 1981, is a far-ranging strategic offer to the USSR. The newly edited and supplemented "null solution" for intermediate land-based missiles offers an historic opportunity for disarmament.

This "most radical" solution of the problem, to quote former CPSU General Secretary Yuri Andropov, contains for the West an offer of significant strategic renunciation: abandonment of a nuclear weapon system category which is considered useful for maintaining and upgrading the capability of effectively countering a Soviet threat in Europe by covering targets on Soviet territory.

The NATO partners had previously considered indispensable the option of nuclear escalation in case of war with nuclear carrier weapons which could reliably reach targets in European Russia, if they were to respond to an attack against Western Europe by using the NATO "flexible reaction" strategy with appropriate nuclear weapons.

The purpose of introducing modern U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe after the alliance decision of 1979 was to preserve this escalation capability to implement our own defensive strategy of preventing Soviet attack options under changed conditions, as they were brought about by Soviet arms. The modernization of regional nuclear armament of NATO in Europe (TNF) was therefore implemented by extending the range in conjunction with improved target accuracy and reaction capability, penetration capability into Soviet territory, survival capability of our weapon systems prior to launch against preemptive strikes through increased mobility.

Since the deployment of land-based missile systems with ranges extending from 1800 km (Pershing II) and 2500 km (GLMC Tomahawk cruise missile) at the end of 1983, the USSR has once again, for the first time in 20 years, been brought into range of NATO missiles in Europe. Thus Soviet territory will not be immune from the possibility of inescapable nuclear strikes against military targets in its western regions. In wartime, the USSR cannot therefore expect to be a strategic "sanctuary" for the regional nuclear weapons of NATO in Europe. Availability of a sanctuary vis-a-vis NATO in Europe would tilt the strategic East-West situation to the advantage of the Warsaw Pact, by providing the Soviets with an option of conducting limited warfare west of the Soviet border.

Offensive Warfare Against Western Europe is a Nuclear Risk Once More

The change which occurred in the European situation in 1983 has once again raised nuclear hazards for Soviet offensive warfare against Western Europe, which had not existed for 15 years: aimed missile attacks within European distances. These risks to European Soviet territory eliminate the possibility that a war limited to the western approaches to the USSR could either involve the use of nuclear weapons or that the Soviet nuclear threat would be sufficient to deter NATO from considering the use of its nuclear weapons, i.e., to block the NATO strategy of flexible reaction, thus opening the way for an attack by the Warsaw Pact in Europe with the superior conventional forces of Soviet military power, without danger to the Soviet aggressor of suffering a response on his own territory--unless this were caused by U.S. strategic nuclear weapons outside of Europe.

But recourse to those central strategic U.S. forces is subject to counterthreat from USSR intercontinental nuclear weapons, which are capable of reaching the United States. That is the reason why NATO, in view of the Soviet medium-range systems aimed specifically at the European alliance territory, considered additional U.S. escalation weapons useful and necessary, such as land-based medium-range missiles, independent of the central strategic offensive options of the U.S. intercontinental systems against Soviet territory and the "Poseidon" SLBM at sea as a means of strategic deterrence in the East Atlantic European NATO area.

NATO Limited Counterthreat on a Smaller Scale

The limitation of the newly created escalation options in Europe, carefully calculated by the allies, to a maximum of 572 additional nuclear target options (for which a like number of nuclear warheads are withdrawn from the TNF inventory in Europe) prevents the creation of something like a "Euro-strategic" structure for limited warfare in Europe, and the possiblity of the USSR being confronted by NATO with the means for a massive nuclear weapon strike in Europe.

Thus since 1983 the NATO allies have not exposed the USSR to a challenge which would be critical for Soviet survival in war or for the security of the Soviet Union. They have since 1979 limited themselves to countering the new threat to NATO in Europe from the Soviet SS-20s with a limited

counterthreat on a smaller scale to selected military targets in the western USSR; this would place the USSR in a situation similar to that encountered by Western Europe in the shadow of the SS-20. We should note in this context that this Western target selection does not constitute an equivalent to the Soviet threat with land-based medium-range missiles as to number of weapons, effective range or number of targets which could be attacked. It merely creates an essentially similar threat situation, which however is more closely limited geographically than it is in the other direction.

In addition, the NATO partners subjected this new situation to a political condition in case of a successful negotiation offered to the USSR in 1979 in the Brussels "twin-track" decision as a prior choice. In return for the desired negotiated parity the United States offered the so-called "null solution" in 1981, which however related to the USSR as a whole and the entire American continent, without restriction to only the European area (which is the geographic limitation desired by the USSR). This first proposal was followed in 1983 by an additional offer from President Reagan, not to equal the number of SS-20s in the USSR exclusively by U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe (i.e., to leave the Soviet SS-20 in East Asia without counter-deployment until such time as reduction to zero had been achieved, or while parity limitations of the number of warheads on both sides were covered by an interim agreement. Finally, the Americans had in 1983 offered the USSR a number of alternate choices, ranging from 50 to 450 warheads, for parity limitations.

Later, after the Geneva INF negotiations resumed in 1985, Reagan proposed for an interim agreement a parity of 140 launch systems each for land-based medium-range missiles--i.e., 420 SS-20 warheads (three to each missile) on the Soviet side and 420 to 450 (with a variable composition of the U.S. LRINF) on the U.S. side; in addition, he limited the U.S. demand for withdrawal of the SS-20s in Asia to a proportional reduction.

During the Geneva INF negotiations between 1981 and 1983, the USSR had never offered the removal of all SS-20s facing NATO. Even the most generous offer made by Andropov still provided for 120 SS-20s in the European area, i.e., 360 launch-ready nuclear warheads on those missiles. In other words, the Soviets rejected the Western offer to remove land-based medium-range missiles and their nuclear warheads world wide between the United States and the USSR.

Soviet leaders, from Brezhnev to Gorbatchov, have always firmly rejected the proffered equation of mutual option renunciation in weapon system categories of the nuclear arsenals which are meaningful for Europe and Asia. For a "null solution," as proposed by Andropov in 1982/83 and since renewed by Gorbatchov, they have demanded that U.S. combat aircraft with nuclear capability with ranges including Soviet territory from their European bases (or worldwide) be included therein. On the other hand, they have always excluded comparable Soviet combat aircraft having the range and nuclear capability facing the European NATO area and the U.S. forces stationed there from all their proposed INF agreements. They want such offensive weapon systems to be exempted from any kind of limitations and also from arms control, because while they are capable of attacking Western Europe, they are unable to attack the United States.

This one-sided approach favoring the USSR disregards the security requirements of the West European countries to the same degree that it would burden the United States with biased treatment compared with the USSR in a bilateral treaty on INF limitations. It continues using the Soviet definition of "strategic" weapon systems, which includes all offensive weapons capable of reaching the territory of the treaty partner, i.e., all "forward area" overseas-based nuclear-capable combat aircraft and those on the high seas belonging to the United States facing the USSR are considered "strategic," thus misrepresenting parity by tilting against the U.S. side.

Gorbatchov's 15 January Proposal

Additionally, the USSR always demanded counting French and British nuclear arms on the U.S. side of a European INF parity. In the most recent Gorbatchov version of 15 January 1986, this is even replaced with the provision that these arsenals be "frozen," i.e., that the number and quality of weapon systems could no longer be changed. With this stringent provision, the Soviet Union would renounce making an inventory in a U.S.-USSR agreement and would deal with this matter in subsequent negotiations. This means also that they could place an appropriate number of medium-range systems in reserve, regardless of the result of the U.S.-USSR negotiation on an interim agreement.

How this complicated problem of equivalence can be solved within the logic of the Soviet concept of "parity" arms limitations in Europe, remains unanswered even after Gorbatchov's January 1986 proposal.

The last word from the Soviet side had been Kvitzinski's unofficial proposal in Geneva in November 1983, that the USSR would limit the number of its land-based-medium-range missiles in Europe to 120 if the United States would refrain from stationing any medium-range missiles and would agree that the number of SS-20 in the Far East be frozen as of the end of 1983--in other words, 135 missiles with 405 combat-ready warheads. These numbers would not be subject to being equalled by U.S. counterdeployment outside of Europe. This proposal was aimed at leaving the USSR with 765 SS-20 warheads: 360 in Europe and 405 in Asia. It was rejected.

In the opinion of then U.S. chief negotiator for INF limitations, Paul Nitze, Gorbatchov's 15 January 1986 proposal for a "null solution" amounts at best to a new version of the Soviet proposal of 13 Novemeber 1983. This new proposal also is limited to Europe and exempts the Soviet SS-20s in East Asia, while excluding the modernization or increase of British and French strategic systems from an interim agreement and forbidding cooperation between the United States and France and Great Britain in nuclear armament.

The Six Conditions by the U.S. President

The new feature in this Soviet offer is that it provides for removal of all Soviet land-based medium-range missiles in the European area and to destroy them, as well their launch areas. But it calls once again for withdrawal and removal of all U.S. combat aircraft in and near Europe, which the Soviets consider capable of reaching Soviet territory and having nuclear carrying

capability, while comparable Soviet systems facing NATO and the U.S. forces would remain in Europe.

This is the background against which the Reagan version of the "null solution" should be considered, which is directed at removing all land-based medium-range missiles in three annual increments, starting with an initial limitation of medium-range missiles in Europe to 140 launch systems on each side. Six conditions are made for this:

- an agreement of worldwide validity with equal rights and overall top limits for the United States and the USSR;

- inclusion of the British, French and Chinese weapons;

- inclusion of the Soviet SS-20s in East Asia which, in the first phase, would be reduced proportionally to the number in Europe to about 85 launch systems and which, in the second phase, would again be reduced and in the third phase removed entirely;

- start of the removal in the USSR in the first phase down to 140 launchers in the European area, i.e., removal of about 100 SS-20 systems facing Western Europe, so as to reduce the Soviet excess number; depending on the disposition status in the West, a start of removal of U.S. LRINF systems in Germany, Italy, Great Britain, Belgium and the Netherlands, so as to achieve parity at the earliest possible moment;

- inclusion of shorter range medium-range missiles, so as not to maintain Soviet weapon systems of this category in a new "grey area" at the edges of arms control facing Western Europe and permitting their uncontrolled increase;

- thorough verification, including on-site inspections, to monitor complete removal of weapon systems to be eliminated, their nuclear warheads and logistic infrastructure.

For that type of agreement, the USSR would have to agree to international control--as the Western countries are ready to do--and permit significant changes in the structure of its strategic forces with respect to their medium-range missiles, which are part of these forces. Should Moscow accept such an agreement and adhere to it, this would entail a basic change in the quality of arms limitation in East-West relationships and thus in the strategic situation on the Eurasian continent.

That comprehensive a "null solution" would serve to eliminate the entire potential of Soviet land-based continental and medium-range missile weapons within the short period of 3 years. This would result in a breakthorugh for disarmament.

In that way, the USSR would renounce the intra-continental spectrum of offensive options using long-range nuclear weapons carriers designed to Europe and Asia and would thereby partially renounce its strategic options against NATO in an armament area of significance for Europe. It would however retain additional

strategic offensive options toward the European NATO area with long-range weapons, e.g., with the SS-25 variable-range long-range missiles and the Backfire and Fencer combat aircraft. This would entail questions about the significance of U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe and about the necessity for specific tie-in weapons to preserve the strategic unity of the North Atlantic Alliance area to protect Western Europe against a Soviet threat under different circumstances.

In this context, attention must be paid to the causality in the genesis of the security problems which are specific for Europe. The cause can be found in the upgrading of the medium-range attack potential of the USSR by the introduction of the SS-20 and the new "tactical-operational" missiles having shorter range, the SS-12/22 and SS-23, as well as the modern Backfire and Fencer combat aircraft for nuclear attacks on Western Europe.

The SS-20 as an Instrument of Soviet Strategy

Modernization of regional nuclear forces of NATO in Europe has been recognized as a military and security policy necessity since the early 1970s. The type and extent of such a modernization was determined by a number of considerations, including, since 1976, the deployment of SS-20 missiles.

The change in quality was caused by the separation of land-based medium-range missiles from their previously inseparable combination with the land-based intercontinental missiles in the USSR. With the SS-20 missile, Soviet strategy introduced a weapon which it can aim specifically at the overseas allies of the United States and generally at countries within continental range, and one which effectively enables it to make a distinction between threatening the United States and threatening those other countries at its geostrategic periphery.

This option of differentiation between a threat to the United States by intercontinental range strategic nuclear weapons and a threat to Western Europe or Asia by land-based continental range nuclear weapons is a suitable means for exerting separate strategic pressure upon Western Europe and upon Asia--and at the same time of course also a means of conducting limited strategic warfare on the Eurasian continent, i.e., for separating Western European security from North American security.

Therein lies the SS-20's "uncoupling mechanism," a summary description of its role as an instrument of Soviet strategy. True, it is a strategic and political impossibility to reduce the entire "linkage/uncoupling" problem to the technical characteristics or their operational effects and uses to a single weapon system or a single category of weapons. In any case, consideration must be given to the structure of the forces with their range of options, their deployment in case of armed conflict and their recognizable functions as instruments of strategy. However, such weapon system categories as medium-range missiles offer specific options having at least tendentious effects upon the strategic situation or upon other countries.

More European Security Through Greater Stability

In the asymmetric situation on the European continent characterized by considerable structural disparities between East and West, Soviet strategy gained the instrument for flexible and selective targeting at distances ranging from 2000 to 5000 km with the ground-mobile, reloadable and quickly launchable multi-warhead, highly accurate SS-20 missile. This provides a broad spectrum of effective options for a differentiated threat to target areas and target categories. With this instrument it has gained the capability in a confrontation in Europe with NATO and all European countries to determine the conditions for the outcome of a military conflict, i.e., to exercise escalation dominance. Expressed another way, this means the ability to control the spread and escalation of a military conflict and to shatter the case of the NATO strategy of flexible reaction--if and while there are no effective escalation weapons available in Western Europe.

If this instrument of Soviet strategy were once again eliminated, it for 1984 would at the same time be amenable to a mutual limitation of medium-range missile weapons of shorter range--on the Soviet side, the SS-12/22 and SS-23--to the lowest possible level and to include the older NATO missiles in an agreement, this would contract the structure of European security toward a condition of greater stability.

The geopolitical and strategic unity of the Western alliance (including Japan) would be preserved; the global relationship between the USSR and the United States would be strategically stabilized to the extent that European risks of conflict or tensions would be lowered to the advantage of European security. The great tasks of establishing parity of the conventional military force relationship and the alliance mission of preserving the effectiveness of the NATO strategy of flexible reaction under the umbrella of U.S. deterrence would have to be solved by different means.

The unavoidable renunciation of the U.S. medium-range missiles would have to be compensated for with other weapon systems and deployment methods under the NATO strategy; but parity-oriented arms control could be a means toward that end. The twin-track decision of 1979 and its implementation would have proven worthwhile.

Whether or not the USSR would really agree to this concept and implement it as to policy and strategy is an open question. In any case, it would result in a balanced limitation in the area of land-based medium-range systems between the United States and the Soviet Union.

9273/12951
CSO: 5200/2668

U.S.-USSR GENEVA TALKS

CHINA URGES U.S.-SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS CUTS

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 29, No 16, 21 Apr 86 pp 14-15

[Article by Ruan Di]

[Text]

The reduction of the two superpowers' nuclear weapons by 50 percent was first proposed by the Chinese government at the Second Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament in June 1982. At that time many countries were deeply concerned about the lack of progress since the First UN General Assembly's Special Session on Disarmament in 1978. The threat to world peace had never been more serious.

In light of the situation, the Chinese delegation spelt out its stand on disarmament. One of the measures put forward was the request that the Soviet Union and the United States cease all nuclear testing, halt the qualitative improvement and manufacture of any kind of nuclear weapons and reduce their existing nuclear arsenals by 50 percent. These included intercontinental, medium-range and tactical nuclear weapons, as well as their means of delivery.

While detailing these measures, the Chinese delegation pointed out this would be the first concrete step to finally putting an end to the nuclear arms race. At the 38th UN General Assembly in 1983, a member of the Chinese delegation elaborated on the proposal. He said that after the Soviet Union and the United States had taken concrete steps to curb the testing, improvement and manufacturing of nuclear weapons and had agreed to halve their nuclear weapons, as well as their means of delivery, an international conference should be convened with representatives from various countries including those from all the nuclear-weapon states, to negotiate an overall reduction of nuclear weapons.

The 50-percent reduction proposal deals with of the issue of the quantity of nuclear weapons while the call for a halt on their testing, improvement and manufacture concerns their quality. Both reflect the reality of the urgent desire of the world's people to put an end to the US-Soviet arms race. It is not an unreasonable demand to urge the two superpowers, which possess more than 95 percent of the world's nuclear warheads, to halve their nuclear arsenals. Furthermore, it would also be a practical step to prevent the qualitative escalation of the arms race.

At the same time, China has repeatedly stated that the small number of nuclear weapons it possesses are purely for defense. China would never be the first to

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FBIS-TAS-90-[illegible]
17 May 1990

[illegible] CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN TREAT PROPOSED IN GENEVA

PRAVDA Commentary

[illegible] Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 90 First Edition p 5

["The USSR's New Initiatives on Chemical Weapons" -- PRAVDA headline]

[Text] Geneva, 22 Apr [illegible] -- The new Soviet proposals on banning chemical weapons, which were announced by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in Berlin on the 21st GDR Congress, were proposed to Geneva today at the disarmament conference.

These proposals allow an elimination of the differences so far existing at the talks using field tests and a resolute progress forward in working out a convention that would ensure full and universal destruction of chemical weapons by the end of the present century.

The Soviet Union, as was said in M. Gorbachev's statement on 23 January 1990, favors the speedy, total elimination of chemical weapons and the very industrial basis for their manufacture. Our country is prepared to provide an prompt declaration of the locations of enterprises for the production of chemical weapons and to cease their production, to start working out procedures for destroying the manufacturing basis and to begin, even after the appropriate convention enters force, eliminating chemical weapon stocks. All of this would be carried out under strict supervision, including international verification on site.

The new Soviet proposals proceed from the statement of 23 January 1990. Their essence was set out by the Soviet representative at the disarmament conference, Viktor I. Israelyan.

Two months that the destruction of chemical weapon stocks should be started by every given taking part in the convention not later than 6 months, and the destruction or dismantling of installations for their production not later than 1 year after the convention comes into force. Moreover, 30 days after that time the participants will have to declare the exact location of every installation for the production of chemical weapons, including components for so-called binary weapons. This applies to any such installations, irrespective of whether they are in state or private ownership.

The Soviet proposals allow an effective, timely cessation of chemical weapons production. Every participant state, immediately after the convention comes into force, will have to halt all activity at installations for chemical weapons production. For the period of 3 months after the convention comes into force these taking part will be obliged to take national measures to close down installations, such as banning occupation of the buildings, cutting off and dismantling all communications serving the installations, and so on.

The Soviet representative also set out specific considerations concerning the procedures for the destruction or dismantling of these objectives.

The new Soviet proposals give a special place to questions of monitoring. The Soviet Union proposes that the closure of every installation for chemical weapons production, including private enterprises, should be ensured by means of strict monitoring, including systematic international on-site verification. It is a question of verifying the correctness of declarations, of the application of seals by inspectors to a site that is being closed, and of periodicaly checking that these remain intact right up to the time that the destruction or dismantling of the site begins. For purposes of effectively monitoring the destruction and dismantling of installations for chemical weapons production, the Soviet Union proposes that there should be provisions for implementing systematic international on-site inspections and that a system for visits to a site by international inspectors should be worked out that would provide for them to be present at all important operations in the destruction or dismantling of the site.

Final international verification would be carried out when the process of eliminating or dismantling the whole site was completed in full.

The Soviet representative also stated that the convention must provide for measures for ensuring that it is observed and unswervingly implemented by every participating state, irrespective of whether one is dealing with state or private enterprises or transnational corporations; primarily ensuring that the use of the commercial chemical industry for the development and production of chemical weapons is not permitted.

V. Israelyan sharply criticized U.S. plans for the production of binary chemical weapons and for the deployment of these in Western European countries. Implementation of these plans, he noted, threatens to transform the thickly populated countries of Western Europe into a potential theater of destructive chemical warfare, primary victim of which would be the civil population. As in the case of the Pershing-2 and long-range cruise missiles, the United States is clearly playing a dishonorable game, counting on deflecting a retaliatory strike on its own territory and exposing the territories and population of its allies to that strike. The siting in Western Europe of binary chemical weapons would reflect, in a most negative way, on the talks taking place at the disarmament conference on a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The Soviet Union resolutely condemns plans for the production and deployment of binary chemical weapons and considers that the U.S. government must realize the responsibility for the consequences of such a step.

On the same day the Soviet delegation in Geneva gave a press conference devoted to the new Soviet steps at the talks on banning chemical weapons.

The Soviet proposals immediately gave rise to lively interest among the delegations at the disarmament conference. In conference circles it is considered that they will give a powerful impulse to the talks that have been dragged out excessively because of the unconstructive position of the United States and several of its allies. The delegates attach particular importance to the bold, constructive Soviet approach to the problem of monitoring. Many stress that it completely refutes assertions that the USSR is supposedly not interested in working out effective means for verifying fulfillment of the convention on banning chemical weapons. In this connection it is noted here that earlier the USSR favored establishing systematic international control over the limited production of the most dangerous chemicals, the so-called hyper-toxic lethal chemicals, which will be permitted under the future convention. Those taking part in the talks assess the new Soviet proposals as graphic confirmation that the words of the Soviet Union do not differ from its practical deeds. It is now up to those who are holding back progress at the talks under various pretexts -- primarily the United States -- to make their reply.

New Proposals Outlined

AU221500 Paris AFP in English 1446 GMT 22 Apr 86

[Text] Geneva, April 22 (AFP) -- The Soviet Union put forward Tuesday at the Geneva disarmament conference a step-by-step plan for banning chemical weapons. Soviet delegate Viktor Israelyan told the conference that immediately after a convention on chemical weapons came into force, "signatory states will have to suspend all activity in chemical weapons-producing installations."

Thirty days after the convention came into force, he said, the same countries "must indicate the precise location" of all such installations, state or privately-owned, and this would include component-producing sites. Within three months, signatory states "will be obliged to take national measures" for closing the installations, Mr. Israelyan said.

The destruction of chemical-weapon stocks would begin within six months, at the latest, after the convention came into force. One year, at the latest, after the same date the destruction or dismantling of the installations themselves would begin.

Concerning supervision, Mr. Israelyan came in favor of "systematic on-the-spot international checking." Western observers noted that Moscow had previously accepted this principle only for the destruction of weapons stocks.

But Mr. Israelyan rejected once again the "open invitation" principle launched by the United States in 1984, under which all convention signatories might verify at any time or place whether a country was abiding by the convention.

'Noble Example' Set

LD232349 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 23 Apr 86

[Boris Adrianov commentary from the "International Diary" program presented by Igor Surguchev]

[Text] By putting forward new proposals at the Geneva disarmament conference on the banning of chemical weapons, the USSR has once again strikingly confirmed that its words match its actions. Moreover, these latest proposals by our country are dictated by a sober appraisal of the existing problem: The USSR sees it as an entirely realistic task to abolish chemical weapons of mass destruction in the present century. Yet that task is not only realistic, it is also exceedingly urgent. If it is to be solved, measures must be taken without delay. This is necessary because of the ever-increasing confirmation that the United States is preparing for chemical war; that war is seen in the strategic centers of the Pentagon -- as a global war, one that threatens the whole of mankind.

The scale of this preparation is shown by the fact that the United States already has in its arsenals 150,000 metric tons of poisonous substances for combat use. They are stored in 3 million units of ammunition of various types. In the opinion of U.S. Senator David Dryor, the existing chemical weapons are enough to destroy the whole population of our planet fifty times over. Meanwhile, the United States has adopted a large-scale 5-year program to renew its chemical potential. This is due to be completed by the end of next year when the Pentagon's chemical arsenal will be topped off with another 2 million bombs, shells, and mines stuffed with military poisons. All this serves to emphasize how acute the task of totally abolishing chemical weapons, which are barbarous devices for the mass destruction of human beings, has become.

That is the purpose of the talks on chemical weapons that are being held in the framework of the Geneva disarmament conference. However, the talks have gone on for an impermissibly long time. This has happened because of the unconstructive position adopted by the United States and some of its allies. They are trying to assert that the USSR is not interested in working out effective means of controlling the observance of the convention banning chemical weapons. The new Soviet initiatives convincingly demonstrate that such arguments -- if they can be called such -- are completely unfounded. Our country's proposals confirm that the USSR stands for the earliest possible total abolition, both of chemical weapons themselves and of the industrial base for manufacturing them. The essence of these proposals flows from the statement by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev on 15 January this year.

The new Soviet initiatives envisage precise dates for the destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles and for the destruction and dismantling of the sites where they are produced. It is particularly emphasized that this applies to any such facilities, regardless of whether they be state-owned or privately owned.

A very important place in our country's new proposals is given to questions of control -- the strictest control, including systematic international on-site checking. Even such details are envisaged as the sealing of the facilities subject to closure and periodic inspection of their intactness up to the time when destruction or dismantling of the facilities begins.

In the matter of banning chemical weapons, as in other questions of disarmament, all participants in the talks must be willing to look at matters afresh. That is being demonstrated in full measure by the USSR, by its bold and constructive approach to the problem of control, in its new proposals on banning chemical weapons. Will the Western participants in the Geneva disarmament conference follow this noble example?

Need for Chemical Weapons Ban Reiterated

LD240019 Moscow TASS in English 2019 GMT 23 Apr 86

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS -- TASS news analyst Leonid Ponomarev writes:

The Soviet Union declares for banning chemical weapons and for complete elimination of such weapons everywhere. This is one of the main directions of the Soviet foreign policy. The Soviet Union's new proposals for banning chemical weapons, submitted to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, fully reflects this invariable Soviet course and open real opportunities for drawing up an international convention that would ensure the elimination of such weapons everywhere by the end of this century. Chemical weapons, first of all, are essentially weapons of mass destruction of civilian population. They are offensive, not defensive weapons, and are meant exclusively for the destruction of humans, with material values remaining intact.

The strike power of up-to-date chemical warfare agents, particularly binary agents (filled with nerve gas) is described by the following characteristics: While in 1914 it took approximately 1,000 mg of mustard gas to kill a human, the United States possessed as early as the sixties highly toxic chemical agents whose killing power was 10,000 times greater. And the toxin of botulism evolved in the USA is 1,000 times stronger thatn highly toxic agents.

Developing such weapons, the United States proceeds from the premise that it will be used not on the United States' territory but in countries that are Washington's allies, above all in Western Europe. This is safer and more convenient for Washiugton since U.S. medium-range missiles have also been deployed there. Large stockpiles of U.S. chemical weapons are kept on the FRG's territory, specifically. Binary ammunition is also planned to be deployed there. It should be noted the the "Autumn Forge-85" exercises were held on the FRG territory last September. During those exercises U.S. and West German units were drilled in operations with the use of chemical weapons, including binary weapons.

The Pentagon's representatives declared more that once that the United States must view chemical warfare as part of any conflict. This means that U.S. forces might use chemical weapons any time, proceeding from Washington's strategic and tactical considerations. Drawing up plans for combat use of chemical weapons in Europe, U.S. military experts have already determined the targets, the ways of dealing strikes, chemical ammunition supply rates, and so on and so forth. Thus, the United States starts on another direction of the arms race, which is a continuation of the United States overall militaristic course.

The Soviet Union is in favour of an early and complete elimination of chemical weapons and of the industrial base for their production. The Soviet Union's new proposals also envisage a balanced and wide system of control, including international on-site inspections. The threat of mankind's poisoning with chemical weapons must be averted forever.

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CSO: 5200/1339

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

SOVIET PAPER NOTES BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION ANNIVERSARY

PM110947 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 10 Apr 86 p 3

[Konstantin Mezentsev "Commentator's Opinion": "No to Biological Weapons!"]

[Text] The convention on banning the development, production, and stockpiling of bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons and on their destruction was signed in Moscow, Washington, and London 14 years ago, 10 April 1972. Very great importance attaches to this docunent in international law, which has now been signed by representatives of over 90 states. After all, the convention puts a total ban on one of the most dangerous types of weapons of mass annihilation and sets a graphic example of how a ban can in principle be achieved on all other means of man's obliteration.

But any international treaty only plays its part when its parties honestly fulfill the undertakings they have assumed. Unfortunately, the facts show that some Western parties to the convention are avoiding fulfilling it. This applies primarily to the United States, which was one of the depositaries of the document and bears special responsibility for its fulfillment.

But the Pentagon has its own logic. Preparation for combat operations using all weapons, including bacteriological ones, is in full swing in the United States. Enormous combines have been created there for the production of viruses and microbes as have testing grounds and storage facilities for the pathogens of human and animal diseases. As THE NEW YORK TIMES has pointed out, such centers are in operation in Edgewood, Pine Bluff, and Fort Detrick. The Pentagon's "specialists" are also moving their "experiments" in the use of biological weapons beyond the United States. The U.S. warmongers have used them during their adventures in Korea and Vietnam, against Cuba and Nicaragua. The United States has stockpiled bacteriological weapons in the FRG, Spain, and Britain.

These dangerous preparations are generating anger and indignation among all progressive mankind. The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries are waging a persistent struggle to eliminate the terrible threat looming over the planet and to remove from military arsenals all types of weapons of mass destruction, including those as barbaric as biological weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1339

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

GORBACHEV DISCUSSES ARMS ISSUES DURING APRIL VISIT TO GDR

Addresses SED Congress

LD181102 Moscow TASS in English 1029 GMT 18 Apr 86

[Excerpts] Berlin, 18 Apr (TASS)--Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, made the following address to the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (SED) here today:

Esteemed Comrade Chairman,

Dear comrades, friends,

On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union I cordially greet the 11th Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany.

Comrades,

Problems of war and peace feature prominently at your congress, and with good reason. The international situation remains tense and acute. And we communists consider it our paramount duty to do everything possible to stop the world from sliding toward nuclear catastrophe.

It is exactly the striving for these aims that had dictated also our trip to Geneva, the moratorium on nuclear explosions and the concrete programme of fully liquidating nuclear arms which was set forth in January. These major initiatives accorded with the interests of all nations and were energetically supported by the allied socialist countries, by many countries of the world. People began to hope for a change in the political atmosphere for the better.

But alas, today this hope is being subjected to serious trials. The military-industrial complex that rules in the United States is clearly not suited by a turn towards a normalisation of the international situation. The arms merchants shudder at the mere thought that the Soviet Union and the United States might reach agreement on disarmament. Contrary to the pressing interests and aspirations of all people, including its own people, Washington has taken to the road of actually undermining the Geneva accords, the road of actions that only further complicate the already tense situation in the world arena.

I refer first of all to the two sinister nuclear explosions in Nevada which destroyed a unique chance to give the process of disarmament a real start. I also refer to the impudent action taken by the United States against Libya that is fraught with the danger of a serious worsening of the situation in the world.

Everything shows that Washington has decided in its usual manner to teach the Arab countries a lesson, to force them to give up their struggle for a just settlement of the conflict in the Middle East. But this is also evidence of the bankruptcy of the American policy in the region--a policy of maneuvers and separate deals in favor of Israel, a policy profoundly hostile to the interests of the Arab peoples.

No reference to terrorism give the American Administration the right to play the role of an "international judge" and self-appointed chastiser, to replace the principles of international intercourse with jungle law. The more so that the matter is not in acts of terrorism that are firmly condemned by the entire international community.

It is for many years now that U.S. imperialists have been keeping up pressure on Libya and other Arab countries upholding their sovereign rights and defending the just cause of the Arab people of Palestine.

The USSR and other socialist countries have been demonstrating their solidarity with Libya in words and in deeds. They have warned about grave responsibility the United States is shouldering by engaging in armed aggression against an independent country which is a U.N. member.

Set against a broad international context, the crime against Libya as well as the stubborn continuation of nuclear testing and the escalation of threats against Nicaragua cannot be viewed as isolated developments. They all are manifestations of the general policy of Washington whose militarist, aggressive nature has revealed itself most visually these days.

I would like to stress that in Washington and in the European capitals they should realize that such actions are doing direct harm also to dialogue between the USSR and the United States and between East and West in general. There should be no pretending that the U.S. Administration is not aware that Soviet-U.S. relations cannot develop independently of how the United States is behaving on the international scene and what kind of situation is taking shape as a result.

It should be clear to every sensible person who who is really working for peace and who is pushing nations into the nuclear precipice. One can imagine what would be left of the human race and its civilization were the Soviet Union behaving in the world like the United States.

Such short-sighted, egoistic and adventurist policy is, moreover, in principle alien to socialism.

At this moment of responsibility no one may dodge discharging one's duty to the present and succeeding generations. The destiny of peace must not be left at the mercy of U.S. militarists.

As far as the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community are concerned, they have acted and will continue to act being fully aware of their responsibility.

Today we declare with utter certainty: Our proposals for eliminating nuclear weapons and bridling the arms race hold good. If the governments of Western countries are really concerned about the fate of peace, it is high time they began matching their words with deeds.

This is yet to happen. Let us take Europe. We can point out that the Soviet Union made a big concession by suggesting that the Soviet and American medium-range nuclear missiles be removed from the whole territory of Europe on the condition that the other NATO countries, Britain and France, would not build up their missile potentials. But now the very same governments that only recently regarded the Soviet SS-20 missiles as the main threat to Western Europe declare that this is not enough, that the road to the further buildup of missiles and nuclear warheads by Britain and France should not be blocked.

Where is logic here, may I ask, where is the principle of equality and equal security? There is no trace of them

There is no logic in the policy of West Germany as well. Its government keeps talking about its commitment to peace and its desire to develop cooperation with socialist countries and pledging that war will never be launched from the territory of the country. But what do we have in reality? It is in West German territory that Pershings and cruise missiles targeted eastwards are lurking. No other West European government, it seems, has given such a wholehearted support to the American militarist SDI program. Moreover, Bonn has complemented it with a European "star wars" plan. All this is all the more alarming since the ruling class of West Germany continues to claim that there is an "open German question," has not given up revanchist plans.

The Soviet Union attaches much importance to the development of relations with West Germany as a major European state. What is more, we are prepared to develop these relations on an equal basis and to mutual benefit. But this calls first and foremost for Bonn's policy to meet in practice the interests of peace and security. We want to stress in the context that we unconditionally support the legitimate demand of the GDR to West Germany that relations between them be fully brought into accordance with the commonly recognized norms of international law.

Discussing the situation in Europe, we see another major problem, namely, the confrontation in the continent of powerful forces armed with conventional weapons.

Two groupings of troops, each [illegible] million strong and possessing the most advanced types, missiles and planes, [illegible] each other in Europe. Moreover, what is called conventional weapons are constantly being improved and made more sophisticated and powerful, their effects becoming more and more like those of weapons of mass destruction.

There is one more aspect to this problem. We are told that Western Europe cannot give up nuclear weapons, including American ones, because in this case it would allegedly feel less secure in the face of the conventional armed forces and armaments of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. And the rightist press is trying to back this false argument and to scare people with fantastic scenarios of the invasion of the West in a bunch of Soviet tanks.

What do we think necessary to say in this context?

To begin with, the elimination of nuclear weapons in Europe would create a new situation in Europe not only for the West but also for ourselves. We should not forget that invasions of our territory in the pre-nuclear age were mounted from the West, and more than once.

One thing. I would like to appeal to all the West Europeans from here, from the capital of the socialist USSR. Do our bellicose allegations about the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, that country will never and under no circumstances begin armed operations against Western states or its allies because targets of a NATO attack? I repeat, never!

We would like to have this position with a new initiative, now applied to the conventional armaments and armed forces. The USSR suggests that agreement be reached on substantial reductions in all the components of the land forces and tactical air forces of the European states and the relevant forces of the USA and Canada deployed in Europe. The formations and units to be reduced should be disbanded and their weaponry either destroyed or stored in national territories. Geographically, reductions, obviously, should cover the entire European territory from the Atlantic to the Urals. Operational-tactical nuclear weapons could be reduced simultaneously with conventional weapons.

The question of dependable verification at every stage of this progress is very itself. Both national technical means and international forms of verification, including, if need be, on-site inspection, are possible.

In short, this is a subject for serious negotiations. We believe that the formulation of the question in a broader context will make it possible to cut the knot which has been growing tighter at the Vienna talks over so many years now.

We attach no less importance to deliverance from chemical weapons. Seeking to expedite the conclusion of a relevant international convention, the Soviet Union will table at the disarmament conference within the next few days a number of new proposals making it possible to remove the differences which have so far remained.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

He urged the Soviet Union and the United States to conduct serious negotiations and reach agreement as early as possible on halting the test, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, drastically reducing all types of nuclear weapons they have deployed anywhere inside and outside their countries and destroying them on the spot. He also urged the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty Organization to reach agreement as early as possible on the drastic reduction of their conventional armed forces and armaments.

Forty nations joined the current CD session which began on February 4 and is expected to conclude on April 25.

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CSO: 5200/4033

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

ROMANIA'S SCINTEIA COMMENTARIES ON NUCLEAR ISSUES

Halting Nuclear Tests

AU011136 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 0925 GMT 1 Apr 86

["Halting the Nuclear Tests--a Major Demand for Implementation of Disarmament and Elimination of Atomic Danger"--AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest AGERPRES 1/4/1986--While marking the international year of peace halting the nuclear arming is a vital problem for the very existence of mankind, so gravely threatened by the huge destructive potential amassed in the contemporary world, reads a commentary headed as above, carried on April 1st by SCINTEIA.

Related to the proposal issued by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CC of the CPSU, in his recent televised speech according to which the Soviet Union is resolved to continue over March 31 the moratorium it set until that date on all the nuclear tests and to make no nuclear detonations even after that date provided that the United States did the same, the quoted newspaper reads: "No doubt this is a proposal that cannot be but welcomed and supported by all the peace-loving forces, it is a realistic and constructive proposal in consensus with the major demands of the cause of peace. It is certain that a general halt in the tests on nuclear weapons would mark a particularly important step along the path of diminishing and eliminating the nuclear danger, of passing to nuclear disarmament."

In this respect the newspaper mentions the call Romanian President Nicolae Ceausescu recently addressed to the USSR and the U.S. in a speech he made at the plenary meeting of the SDUF [Socialist Democracy and Unity Front] National Council. He stressed: "We believe it is necessary and we call on the Soviet Union to continue its nuclear test moratorium. We call on the United States of America to join in the moratorium announced by the Soviet Union, to stop nuclear tests. We are for a general agreement to end nuclear tests by all states. We think this is a prime necessity and ought to be the first action in this international year of peace."

Facts, realities--SCINTEIA goes on--convincingly prove that nothing can justify the continuation of nuclear tests. Referring to the statement made by the general secretary of the CC of the CPSU in the same broadcast speech, regarding the possibility of another meeting as soon as possible with the U.S. President to exchange opinions on this vital question and to prepare an adequate accord, SCINTEIA writes:

"One can only welcome such a meeting. Romania has steadily supported international dialogue, underscored that political negotiation represents the only rational way to come to mutually acceptable accords. No procedure matter or other considerations can justify the procrastination or postponement of constructive efforts to reach understandings--as required by the world's peoples, by the foremost interests of peace.

Given the peculiar importance of the whole issue of halting nuclear tests and the atomic arms race, the new USSR proposals should be wisely considered and hasty answers, negative prejudiced and aprioric positions should be avoided. At a time when international developments are taking an alarming course, decision-makers in all nuclear-weapon possessor states are expected to show a high sense of responsibility for the fate of peace.

Resolutely backing any rational constructive proposals which answer the aims of peace and disarmament, Romanian public, opinion, the whole Romanian people are for an undelayed stop to nuclear explosions. This would prove that words and deeds concord and would contribute to the elimination of mistrust and suspicion from international relations, stimulating the conclusion of true and efficient accords on disarmament in the interests of a lasting peace on our planet.

Disarmament Measures

AU021913 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1559 GMT 2 Apr 86

[Text] Bucharest, April 2, AGERPRES--Romania believes that nuclear disarmament is not something that can be done at once, but a process with successive stages which should be initiated by certain steps, however small, the newspaper SCINTEIA writes in a commentary titled "The Top Priority: The Removal of the Nuclear Threat," run in its April 2 issue in the section devoted to the international year of peace. The newspaper shows that, first of all, an end should be immediately put to the deployment of new missiles and a deadline should be set for the elimination of the ones [as received] sites in Europe, taking into account the grave situation created in the continent; at the same time, considering that there is no limit to the effects of atomic weapons, it is imperative that a passage be made to their elimination, no matter where they are sited.

Recalling that Romania believes in the need for all countries that hold atomic arms to be gradually included in the nuclear disarmament process, SCINTEIA writes: It is natural that every country that holds nuclear weapons should be ready to pass on to nuclear disarmament measures. Opposing participation in the respective measures, rejecting integration into a nuclear disarmament process and sticking to a "national nuclear arsenal" can only obstruct the road to that aim and provide reasons for the others' reluctance being conductive to shifts in the balance of forces that one side or another might take unacceptable, and all this could generate a blocking of the general process.

Stressing the need for all nuclear states to cease nuclear tests, as such tests are an important link and an integral part of the nuclear arms race, SCINTEIA points out: There is no ground for the assertion of a disarmament wish as long as nuclear tests go on (and the U.S. has provided a recent example), as long as a passage fails to be made to the setting up of a general moratorium. The first step to be taken in the international year of peace is, undoubtedly, the cessation of nuclear tests by all nuclear powers and the conclusion of a general agreement in this respect. That is why, as shown by its president, Romania thought it necessary to call on the Soviet Union to extend its moratorium on nuclear tests, and to urge the United States to join in the moratorium set up by the USSR. In context, one can but welcome the Soviet Union's resolution, announced by the CC of the CPSU General Secretary, to extend its moratorium until March 31 and to carry on no nuclear blasts, even after that date, if the U.S. does the same. Moreover, the general secretary of the CC of the CPSU showed his readiness to meet as soon as possible with the U.S. President to discuss the matter with a view to preparing an appropriate agreement. Obviously, the conclusion of such an agreement would be significant on an international plane, it would make a substantial contribution to lessening distrust and provide a favourable basis for other mutually acceptable understandings to be reached, being a step forward towards attaining the major goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, the newspaper mentions.

Romania, the commentary winds up, believes in the imperative of stepping up the peoples' struggle and strengthening their unity of action. And this is the meaning conveyed by the call the Romanian president addressed to all states, governments and heads of state, to all the nations of Europe and the world, by the declaration and call of the Socialist democracy and Unity Front to democratic parties and organizations, the governments and peoples of Europe, the U.S. and Canada, in other continents.

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CSO: 5200/3028

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PDRY CHAIRMAN SUPPORTS SOVIET STAND ON NUCLEAR TESTS

GF121414 Aden Domestic Service in Arabic 1230 GMT 12 Apr 86

[Text] Brother Engineer Haydar Abu Bakr al-'Attas, member of the YSP Political Bureau and chairman of the Supreme People's Council Presidium, has received a message from the USSR leadership dealing with the Soviet stand on U.S. nuclear testing and the efforts made by the USSR to halt the nuclear arms race and end nuclear testing, and the lack of U.S. responsiveness to the peaceful initiatives and proposals to stop such tests, in view of the dangerous effects that they have on life and the future of humanity, and peace and security in the world. Brother al-'Attas has affirmed the PDRY's total support for the stands and initiatives of the friendly USSR regarding the achivement of a total ban on the testing of nuclear arms for the sake of achieving peace and security in the world.

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CSO: 5200/4502

RELATED ISSUES

FRG LEADER CALLS U.S. ESSENTIAL FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY

Bonn DIE WELT in German 11 Feb 86 p 4

[Article by Volker Ruehe, vice-chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary fraction: "No Security Without USA"]

[Text] Those who wish to foster European-American relations will try to prevent the rise of a feeling of overmuch European dependence on the United States. And they will at the same time counteract the resentment existing in America, according to which Europe is not prepared to undertake its proportional share of the responsibility for Western foreign and security policy.

Common Values

The basis of the European-American historical community is the common democratic value structure and social order that differentiate us clearly from the totalitarian system of the East. Only a total depoliticization of the East-West relationship, and only making light of the causes of the splitting of Europe, could lead to a political and moral equating of West and East, such as is concealed in the formula "Security partnership with the East."

Such concepts only cloud the issue of with whom and from whom security must be created. The security partners for the preservation and defense of peace and freedom in the Federal Republic of Germany are our alliance partners, especially the United States. With them we create the common security in the alliance, which represents the basis for East-West negotiations on mutual security with the East. Neither the Soviet Union, therefore, nor the other Warsaw Pact states can be characterized as our security partners. But they are indeed negotiating partners for more mutual security with the East.

The creation of common security within the alliance as the basis for mutual security between East and West challenges each member of the alliance to undertake the necessary defense-policy efforts,

with a calculable and credible security policy, which are indispensable for the maintenance of a credible deterrent capability in the alliance. Thus the federal government, with the autumn 1981 stationing decision, as also with the smoothening of the basic military-service obligation, has shown its determination to implement the unavoidable--if also unpopular--measures for assuring an effective defense capability.

The military presence of the United States and its nuclear protection is indispensable for Europe and could not even be replaced by an independent European deterrent. The Soviet threat can only be offset by the American readiness to defend Europe. This dependence on the United States, necessary for our security, will be the easier for Europe to bear, the more the latter is willing and able to reduce needless dependence through its own efforts and to undertake more responsibility in the Atlantic relationship.

The more we Europeans do by our own strength--as we can do, thanks to our economic and political power--and the more political responsibility Europe accepts for upholding the west's interests --and thus its own interests as well--the more the United States will fulfill its responsibility for Western Europe.

The strengthening of the European contribution must not be seen as limited only to the military field. Rather, it is a matter also of making Europe stronger, and thus more self-confident as well, through intensive political, economic and technological cooperation, and of being able to make proper use of specifically European capabilities (and interests as well) in dealing with important international problems. It can very well happen that the European position differs from the American. This should not be regarded as a disadvantage, but rather as the natural hallmark of a self-confident partnership between Europeans and Americans.

For this policy to be successful, however, 3 conditions must be fulfilled: a harmonized assessment of the situation (with mutual respect for differences of opinion that may arise in the process), similar objectives, and action that is mutually complementary. Especially in the situation assessment, Europeans and Americans must reciprocally harmonize their (totally understandable) differing ways of seeing things. The West-Europeans must have a stronger regard for the global aspect of the East-West relationship, and the United States must more clearly recognize and utilize its European components.

Self-Confident Partners

Through the political and military strengthening of the European pillar of the western community and the [illegible]

European-American harmony, the way can also be barred to those political forces among us that preach distrust of the Americans, demand that "Europe assert itself" vis-a-vis the United States, and want to foment a feeling of over-dependence on America. Such political forces exist in our society in the form of left-nationalists just as well as in the right wing. Only if Europe develops a self-confident partnership with the United States can the dangers to the "mental health" of this indispensable alliance be averted.

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CSO: 5200/2644

RELATED ISSUES

CANADA'S CLARK OPPOSES WITHDRAWAL FROM NATO, NORAD

Ottawa THE WEEKEND CITIZEN in English 5 Apr 86 p A16

[Article by Joe Clark]

[Text]

External Affairs Minister Joe Clark wrote the following article in rebuttal to a column by military analyst Gwynne Dyer. Clark counters Dyer's argument that quitting Canada's military alliances with the United States and Western Europe risks "being a monkey wrench in the wheels of the machine that is delivering us to our doom."

Columnist Gwynne Dyer has argued Canada should leave the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the North American Aerospace Defence Command to make "nuclear war ... less likely to happen."

He believes we could become a Canadian Finland.

Both his assumptions are wrong.

Leaving the Western alliance would make nuclear war more likely. The Soviets might be emboldened by a break in the West. NATO would feel weakened, and some of its members might be driven to hawkish demonstrations of strength.

The atmosphere that led to the Reagan-Gorbachev summit could be shattered, and the road closed again to negotiated arms control.

Second, Canada could never be Finland. The Finns are an estimable people, shaped by their own nature and history. But their nature and history are different from ours.

We are proud of our role as an international peacekeeper, a moderate and reasonable country. But moderation is a means, not an end. Our purpose is to enlarge freedom. We prefer to do that by advocating peaceful settlement of disputes by fighting poverty and famine, and by promoting respect for human rights.

But we have also always been prepared to defend our values, by force of arms if necessary. The determination and gallantry of Canadians in two world wars and in Korea are as much a part of our history as diplomacy and development. There is nothing neutral in Canada's nature of tradition.

Geography is not the paramount reason we belong in NATO or NORAD. Freedom is. Those alliances, with all their imperfections, defend a system of free societies and — by maintaining strength in the face of Soviet strength — help keep the peace.

It demeans Canadians, and misreads our history, to suggest that we stay in NATO because leaving it would displease the United States. We are in NATO because we belong there, just as we belong in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, and in the fields of Asia and Africa teaching agricultural reform.

Indeed, Canada played a key role in the invention of NATO, which both asserts our commit-

ment to freedom and provides the means for ensuring a collective Western approach to fulfilling that commitment. Through NATO, we and others can — and do — influence American policy.

There is no doubt that an uncontrolled arms race would threaten humanity.

Part of our strength is our reputation for working consistently and constructively where we have expertise or standing — on verification, banning chemical weapons, nuclear non-proliferation, and other issues. Part of our credibility is that we do not pretend to be neutral. Part of our authority is that we do not grandstand.

When events move slowly, and fear and frustration increase, the temptation grows to make dramatic gestures. Regularly, as foreign minister, I am invited to embrace some dramatic extreme in Canada's name, so "our voice will be heard."

International events rarely respond to "voices." Change is almost always undramatic, a product of steadiness, not surprise.

What is more curious about Dyer's proposal is its timing.

Two years ago the world was worried by both an increase in arms and a decrease in contacts. Now, at least there is contact, between Soviet and American leaders, negotiators and populations.

The movement has been substantial on both sides. There is the real possibility of progress in reducing overall numbers of arms. The two leaders have agreed to meet regularly, and are appearing on one another's televisions. While progress will, inevitably, be slow, there is more hope now than for several years.

These negotiations are happening, in part, because the Soviet Union was left with no doubt about Western solidarity. Attempts failed to divide NATO over Afghanistan, over missile deployment in Europe, or over the U.S. Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, or Star Wars). Jeopardizing the unit that led to Geneva could jeopardize Geneva itself.

Indeed, the resumption of negotiations between the superpowers makes NATO and NORAD even more important. While only two countries are at the table, all the world's people are affected by the results.

NATO provides Canada, and other allies, with direct access to the details of the negotiations, and influence on the negotiations. In the past we have proposed specific initiatives the Americans could consider raising at the table and have seen our proposals accepted. Surely we would wish to be able to do so again.

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CSO: 5220/35

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CANADA SPENDING $72 MILLION ON CHEMICAL PROTECTION GEAR

Windsor THE WINDSOR STAR in English [illegible] p [illegible]

[Text]

OTTAWA (CP) — The use of chemical weapons in the Afghanistan and Iran-Iraq wars is forcing the Defence Department to spend $72 million this year for clothing and shelter to protect Canadian troops based in Europe, a Defence spokesman has confirmed.

Lt-Col. Bill Johnston, co-ordinator of the Canadian Armed Forces nuclear, chemical and biological branch, said Wednesday four projects are being funded to provide soldiers with better protection against a deadly chemical-biological weapons attack.

"There have been a number of developments recently causing this, including the use of chemicals in the Iran-Iraq war and in Afghanistan," Johnston said in a telephone interview from Ottawa.

He said the Canadian military has received intelligence reports from the five-year-old Persian Gulf war showing the devastating effect chemical weapons can have on ill-equipped troops.

"Very chemical weapons are easy to make and can have a significant impact on troops."

AS WELL, HE noted the Soviet army now has the largest stock of chemical weapons and more than 80,000 Soviet soldiers are employed in the army's chemical corps. That's just [illegible] soldiers fewer than the entire armed forces of this country.

Johnston said new gear and protection for the Canadian military will be of a defensive rather than offensive nature.

Under the program, European-based soldiers will be equipped with general service chemical warfare clothing at a cost of $[illegible] million and new anti-chemical face masks now being developed at a cost of $[illegible] million, while air crews and pilots will get new chemical defence outfits costing $[illegible] million. As well, underground chemical-proof shelters will also be built at Canadian Forces Base Baden in West Germany for $[illegible] million.

There are three types of chemical agents: blood agents, mostly in the form of hydrogen cyanide, attack the oxygen-carrying cells, causing asphyxiation; nerve agents prevent muscle groups from working, and blister or mustard chemicals burn exposed skin.

The new clothing and masks will protect against such chemical weapons, but they will not shelter soldiers from nuclear radiation or biological agents that spread disease.

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